In the early hours of December 26, 2024, when most Nigerians were asleep after Christmas festivities, the roar of precision air strikes rang out over Tangaza Local Government Area of Sokoto State. For 45 minutes, from 11:45 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. on Dec. 25, U.S. military aircraft launched what President Donald Trump described as “a powerful and deadly strike against the remnants of ISIS terrorists in northwestern Nigeria.”
The operation, which experts estimate to cost between $1 million and $3 million, marked a significant expansion of international counterterrorism operations within Nigeria’s borders. Both the U.S. Department of the Army and Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the airstrike was a coordinated operation between the two countries, targeting a terrorist base in the Buni axis of Tangaza, where a major jihadist affiliate is based.
But as expected, the strike sparked heated debate across Nigeria. Skeptics question everything from the presence of ISIS in Sokoto to the legitimacy of American military intervention on Nigerian soil. Kaduna-based Islamic cleric Sheikh Ahmed Gumi went so far as to call the operation a symbol of a “new crusading war against Islam” and called on Nigeria to end all military cooperation with the United States and instead seek aid from China, Turkey and Pakistan.
But as someone who has reported extensively from Tangaza and witnessed firsthand the cross-border jihadist threat creeping into northwest Nigeria, I can say with confidence. These air strikes were not only necessary, they were premature.
The Laclawa Threat: A Clear and Present Danger
In November 2024, my colleague Segun Onibiyo and I published an exclusive investigation into the alarming influx of foreign Islamist terrorists into Nigeria through Tangaza and the porous northwest border from the Sahel region. What we discovered was a chilling truth. The Rakulawa terror group, a jihadist coalition with ambitions of establishing an Islamic caliphate stretching from the Sahel to the coast of Ghana, was actively recruiting local fighters, including Fulani militias, across Sokoto and Kebbi states.
Tangaza, located along the border between Nigeria and the Niger Republic, is an important transportation and operational hub for jihadists. The porous nature of this border facilitates the seamless movement of fighters, weapons, and ideology between the conflict-ridden region of the Sahel and the increasingly fragile northwest of Nigeria. This is not speculation, but a documented reality.
The Laclawans are more than just bandits and cattle drivers. They represent a sophisticated ideologically driven terrorist network affiliated with Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslim (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate operating across the Sahel. Their purpose is clear. To destabilize governments, impose strict interpretations of Sharia law, and expand territorial control. Their methods are equally clear: targeted assassinations, mass kidnappings, extortion, and brutal attacks on those who resist their authority, including Muslims.
Why Sokoto? Understanding strategic importance
Critics have questioned why Sokoto, the historic seat of Nigeria’s caliphate and a region seen as peaceful, would be targeted. This question reveals a dangerous ignorance about modern jihadist strategies.
The symbolic importance of Sokoto cannot be overstated. For groups like Laklawa and its Sahel-based allies, controlling and influencing areas with strong Islamic traditions provides religious legitimacy. Tangaza’s strategic location along smuggling routes and proximity to ungovernable areas of the Republic of Nigeria makes it an ideal base for operations into the Nigerian hinterland.
Moreover, the U.S. military does not invest millions of dollars in precision airstrikes based on intuition. In recent weeks, the U.S. military has conducted intensive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations across Nigeria’s Sahel region. These missions have undoubtedly uncovered reliable intelligence regarding the presence of important terrorist targets in Tangaza, likely including senior commanders planning coordinated attacks across multiple states in Nigeria.
The Sokoto State Government has confirmed that a terrorist stronghold was indeed bombed. Reports from Niger said Nigerien soldiers spotted Laklawa fighters fleeing Tangaza after the attack. The operation targeted a terrorist base where top jihadist commanders were said to be meeting to strategize a major attack. No civilian casualties were recorded, evidence of the accuracy and coordination involved.
President Trump’s “ISIS” rhetoric: A fusion of politics and reality
It must be made clear that President Trump has described the targets as “ISIS terrorist scum.” Laclawa is primarily affiliated with JNIM and al-Qaeda rather than ISIS, but this distinction may be more relevant to terrorism analysts than actual counterterrorism operations. Both organizations share overlapping ideologies, tactics, and objectives. Both seek to establish an Islamic caliphate through violence and terror. Both recruit from the same radicalized groups and exploit the same governance vacuum.
President Trump’s reference to ISIS likely has a dual purpose. The goal is to resonate with an American audience familiar with the atrocities of ISIS, and to simplify a complex security situation into terms that justify decisive action. For Nigerians living under the threat of these groups, whether terrorists pledge allegiance to ISIS, al-Qaeda, or JNIM is far less important than whether they are effectively neutralized.
Wider war: Why this attack matters
This operation represents more than just a tactical victory; it demonstrates renewed international resolve to combat cross-border terrorism in West Africa. For too long, Nigeria has faced these threats with inadequate resources, inadequate intelligence capabilities, and an overstretched military. The engagement of U.S. military assets with advanced surveillance technology, precision strike capabilities, and real-time intelligence will provide Nigeria with the force buildup it sorely needs.
The Rakulawa threat extends beyond Sokoto and Kebbi. Their influence is felt in Zamfara and increasingly in parts of Niger and Kwara states. They operate with impunity in areas where the state presence is minimal or non-existent. They tax communities, recruit disaffected youth, and work with local bandits to create a complex web of crime and ideological extremism.
Sheikh Gumi’s concerns about sovereignty and symbols of American intervention are not without merit in principle. No country should lightly cede control of military operations within its borders. But his suggestion that “terrorists do not fight terrorists” ignores the fundamental difference between legitimate counterterrorism operations conducted with the consent of host countries and the indiscriminate violence carried out by jihadist groups.
His recommendations for Nigeria to seek aid from China, Türkiye or Pakistan are creating problems for Nigeria itself. Are these countries well-positioned to provide the advanced ISR capabilities, precision strike assets, and actionable intelligence that this operation demonstrated? Evidence suggests otherwise.
Looking to the future: Recommendations for sustainable action
The Tangaza strike is an important achievement, but it must not be a one-off event. Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy needs to evolve to address all jihadist threats across the country.
The next priority should be the systematic dismantling of known terrorist groups in the Middle Belt, particularly in Nasarawa, Plateau, Benue and Taraba states. These cells serve as planning and preparation sites for attacks on rural areas that have displaced thousands of people and devastated agricultural production. Combining precision airstrikes targeting these locations with ground operations to clear and hold territory would significantly reduce operational capabilities.
Nigeria also needs to invest in border security infrastructure along its northern border. Technology, surveillance drones, biometric checkpoints and rapid response units will need to replace the current patchwork of understaffed outposts. Regional cooperation with Niger, Chad and Cameroon should be strengthened for a coordinated response to groups abusing borders.
Finally, Nigeria must address governance gaps that make communities vulnerable to jihadist recruitment. When the state is absent, extremist groups fill the void to provide security, justice, education, and economic opportunity. A long-term victory against terrorism requires not only military action but also the restoration of effective governance.
Conclusion: Attacks are necessary for long wars.
The Christmas bombing in Tangaza was not an American jihad against Islam, as some have claimed. These were necessary surgical interventions against a metastatic terrorist threat that endangers Muslims and Christians alike. Laclawa and its affiliates are killing indiscriminately, enslaving communities, and seeking to drag Nigeria into chaos that will engulf the Sahel.
Anyone who doubts the necessity or success of these attacks should ask themselves: Would it have been better to have allowed the terrorists assembled in the Tangaza Forest to carry out whatever atrocities they had planned? Would they prefer that Nigeria confront these transnational threats entirely on its own, without the information and capacity that international partnerships provide?
The fight against terrorism in Nigeria is not yet over. However, on December 25, 2025, an important battle was won over Sokoto. The harder task now begins: building the national capacity needed to maintain pressure, expand operations to other terrorist sites, and ensure that once terrorists are eliminated, they cannot be easily replaced.
The Tangaza strike is important because it shows that Nigeria is not alone in this fight and that those who wage jihad against innocent Nigerians will be punished, regardless of their religious affiliation or international support.
The question now is whether Nigeria has the political will to build on this success or whether the Tangaza attack will remain an isolated incident amid a reactive and inadequate counterterrorism strategy.
For the sake of all Nigerian farmers, traders, students and families living in the shadow of these groups, we must choose the former.
…Stephen Cefas is an investigative journalist, senior research analyst at the African Religious Freedom Observatory, and publisher of the Middlebelt Times. For more than a decade, he has documented religious persecution, terrorism, and forced migration in Nigeria’s Middle Belt.
